Tuesday, May 1

Esse est Percepi

In this paper I first intend to give Philonous/Berkeley’s perceptual relativity argument with regard to the mind-dependence of matter, and then present Hylas’ argument involving the veil of perception, that is, the concept that mind-independent objects cause mind-dependent ideas and these ideas resemble the objects in some way. Next I will put forward Philonous’ response to this, in particular the principle ‘nothing is like an idea except an idea.’ Finally, after describing how Locke would respond to this series of arguments and counter-arguments, including a summary of his representative theory of perception, I will explain which view I find the most appealing and which I find the easiest to defend.

Philonous presents the definitions of sensible things and sensible qualities nearly in the same breath. Sensible qualities, he says, are those qualities which are immediately perceived by the senses and sensible things are either just sensible qualities or a combination thereof.[1] At first, Hylas wants to say that immediately perceived qualities are sensible things but it was soon pointed out to him that no regular object is a sensible quality by this definition. For example, when looking at a ball on the table, we would not think that it was a spherical object sitting on a plane without intervening interpretation. We would instead see just a sea of color of various shades and tints, with no way to evaluate the patterns in the colors. The word immediately here is used in contrast to mediately. Something is immediately perceived if it is directly perceived - if no intervening reason or evaluation gets in the way. Philonous uses the example of letters in a book; the shapes of the letters are immediately perceived, but their meaning is mediately perceived.[2]

Philonous uses an argument from perceptual relativity to support the mind-dependence of matter. Mind-independent objects can exist without having to be perceived but mind-dependent objects must be perceived to exist. Berkeley describes a situation in which a person has one hand colder than the other and a water bath with a temperature between those of the hands. [3] The person sticks each of their hands into the water, and to the colder hand the water seems hot, but to the hotter hand the water seems cold. The water has not changed, however; and because the water seems different to each of the hands, but has not changed, the water must be mind-dependent. The principle he is attempting to prove with this argument is that sensible things exist in our minds and only in our minds. You could argue that it is only the perceived qualities of the water that have changed, but since all experience of objects is mediated through perception, starting along this line of argument will not get you anywhere significant if you are going to play by the rules of an empiricist.

Here Philonous stands with the conclusion that matter is mind-dependent, but Hylas counters that only the ideas of matter are in our minds, and that these mind-dependent ideas are caused by mind-independent matter. For example, in the situation presented by Philonous above, the water itself would have temperature, but the mind would have the ideas of hot and cold. (This specific use of the word ‘temperature’ is perhaps a bit stronger than Hylas would have it, but I don’t think it is necessarily a stretch in the wrong direction.) Our perceptions are relative and vary because they are mind-dependent, but the objects that cause them are not – although the perception of the temperature of the water may shift, you would agree there is still water because the perceptions resemble the object closely enough.

Philonous thinks this resemblance business is a little on the liberal side. Even by Hylas’ admittance, ideas are malleable and impermanent, while objects are autonomous and permanent.[4] How can these two fundamentally different sets of attributes apply to things that are supposed to resemble each other? As mentioned above as a mere aside, perception mediates all experience, so even if the two opposing types of things managed somehow to resemble each other, we would never be able to know about it because we can only get to know the objects through the ideas.

As if this were not enough, Philonous goes on to present Berkeley’s principle that nothing is (or can be) like an idea except an idea.[5] Because nothing can be perceived without invoking ideas, it would seem that whatever invokes the ideas is not an idea, and furthermore, is nothing like an idea. Although there may be more to his argument than this, I couldn’t find it and I’m not sure I’m entirely comfortable with what I feel to be a rather bold statement about the nature of ideas.

Locke uses the terms ‘quality’ and ‘idea’ slightly differently than Berkeley does. For Locke, qualities are in objects and ideas are in minds. There are two kinds of qualities: primary and secondary. Primary qualities are inherent to objects; they cannot be separated; one example is extension. Secondary qualities are powers of the primary qualities to provoke various sensations in the perceiver; examples are color, smell, and taste.[6]

Locke has a representative theory of perception wherein all (simple) ideas are caused by qualities and some of these ideas resemble the qualities, namely the ideas we have of primary qualities.[7] The earlier relation of temperature versus hot/cold as applied to the perceptual relativity example is an accurate summation of Locke’s views as well. This theory is similar to Hylas’ objection to Philonous’ perceptual relativity argument. Locke’s just goes a little further and specifies the circumstances in which ideas resemble and do not resemble objects.

I don’t think Locke would accept Philonous’ statement that nothing is like an idea but an idea. Locke holds that we cannot invent simple ideas ourselves, the only place to get those is through perception and those simple ideas are a fair representation of the actual objects. Locke also believes in the veil of perception, but I think the key here that makes his argument a stronger reply to Philonous than Hylas’ is in his attribution of ‘powers’ to the objects. Instead of saying that some - since no rhyme or reason is given here the overall effect is that they are random – ideas resemble the object and some do not, Locke gives a system by which to analyze our perceptions: primary versus secondary qualities.

Even though Locke’s response would be better than Hylas’ was, I don’t think Berkeley would accept this reply as satisfactory. Locke does provide a better account of why some ideas would resemble the object and some wouldn’t, but Berkeley still wouldn’t think that ideas and objects were closely enough related that they could resemble each other at all. This strikes me as being another presentation of the mind/body problem. Ideas and objects are fundamentally different, so how can they interact? Berkeley solves the problem by saying that objects/bodies don’t exist.

Despite their disagreements I think you could combine Locke’s and Berkeley’s views without being disloyal to either of them through the addition of God – and actually the combination ends up being rather similar to Malebranche’s view of occasionalism. Everything is a mind or is in a mind (an idea), but the ‘objects’ exist in God’s mind, with the veil of perception then being not between objects and minds but between God’s mind and the minds of everyone else. However, even if you liked Locke and Berkeley so much that you wanted to combine their views on perception, Occam’s razor should get in the way.

I feel, like I think many people today do, that Hylas’ substance dualism (the existence of two essentially different types of things, minds and matter) is far more acceptable to me instinctively. It may not be the most reasonable way to feel, but there is still a little bit of a stigma for me with the effect of ideas seeming sometimes (at least somewhat) to be imaginary and that if everything was to be a mind or an idea, then it would be imaginary.

On the other hand, I can talk myself into accepting Berkeley’s view, at least intellectually. Being a solid supporter of finding (and hopefully accepting) the simplest explanation, the fact that Berkeley can do away with the mind/body problem is very satisfying. One objection I had been turning over in my mind was that what if, sometime in the future, we were to encounter sentient beings who had experiences (and scientifically persuasive proof) of the existence of extra things - phenomena, dimensions, whatever – of which we had no experience. These things would have existed before we were aware of them; how then could they exist although we had no experience of them? Obviously you would have to expand your definition of a ‘mind’ as time went on and as experience warranted to make your views as accurate as possible. Because I find Berkeley’s view to be the most logically appealing, that makes it the most defensible position for me as well.



[1] Dialogues p 416

[2] ibid. p 416b

[3] PHK p 475b

[4] ibid. p 432b

[5] ibid. p 432b-433a

[6] ECHU p 286b

[7] ibid. p 287

Saturday, March 17

Time lies, a dead mayfly on the windowsill

It should be very possible to get all philosophical about spring break, especially when one is at work and extremely bored. In essence, I'm getting paid to go off and write this philosophical treatise (Hey, it's St Patrick's Day, my illusions can party a little). Would that this made me a professional philosopher. And so I look around, searching for inspiration. Various parents with reluctant students in tow mill around aimlessly, except for the determined few that walk forcefully down the center aisle. At least somebody knows where they're going. Am I just jealous? Or am I simply angry that this is looking more like a journal entry than a blog post? Fresh start.

I feel as if I am in a state of constant self-betrayal. I loathe boredom, and yet I subject myself to it week after week for a few measly dollars. I soothe myself with promises that it isn't forever and I do need the money. The grey matter oozing out my ears pays no heed to the murmurings, though. What can I do, oh what can I do, oh what can I do, oh what can I do ... chantingchantingchanting, never stopping, never caring, slowly dying, without knowing. But I know everyone feels this, and for the uneducated young there are not many options more attractive than this. The pay is decent for what the work requires, and not stressful. Lovely. This has been an excellent fresh start. But who am I to question the leadings of the Muses?

The post runs short as the whine flows freely.

I will leave this as a testament to the petty trials of the not-yet-full-time philosopher.

Tuesday, January 16

Beyond Civilization

This book is more of a how-to than any of Quinn’s books I’ve read thus far, but even so, it’s more of a show-and-tell than a how-to. He builds on the foundation laid in the reader by the Ishmael trilogy (although the trilogy is certainly no necessary to understand this book) by pointing out extant tribal situation in the midst of Taker culture. Circuses, gypsies, etc. Giving an example from his own life, Quinn describes a newspaper in the production of which he was involved and which was tribal in organization.

I’m not sure if I am up to the task of defining a tribe without referring constantly to Quinn quotes. I’m going to describe what I have recognized as different sorts of tribal organizations. Without expending too much creativity, I’m going to call them working tribes, living tribes, and living+working tribes. One can imagine a Venn diagram of tribal organization.

Working tribes work together (predictably). The impetus for their initial organization can be a common interest, for instance information conveyance in Quinn’s newspaper. A possible problem that I could think of for this is the unfair division of proceeds in relation to input of effort.

Living tribes live together (whee). Their impetus is perhaps a desire to live in the same fashion, or familial relation. There is a sharing of resources (property, income, and the like) for overall livelihood of the group. Communal living (not, necessarily, an isolated ‘commune’) is one term for this. A problem I can see with a living tribe is unfair contribution leading either the hierarchy or unrest.

These two descriptions bring forth a question in my mind…can one be separate from Taker culture by being a member of only one of these two organizational types? I can imagine being in a working tribe and using that as your sole source of income…but here I am stuck. If you are getting all your sustenance from a tribe, are you outside Taker culture? And is it even possible?

I am reminded of a tale of a Mexican fisherman. This fisherman was just coming in from a morning in his boat when an American corporate businessman on vacation approached him.

“Sir,” he said, “I can see that your boat is not yet full. What are you going to do for the rest of the day?”

The fisherman looked up at him and grinned. “I will go home now, have lunch and siesta with my wife, and then later I will play with my children, and in the evening I will play my guitar and talk with my friends.”

“Well, that does sound nice, but why aren’t you going to go catch some more fish? At the rate you seem to be going, you could have a profitable business in no time.”

The fisherman stood and began to tie up his boat. “Why should I catch more fish, when I and my family can live on what I have just caught?”

The businessman smiled affectedly, relishing this chance to teach the fisherman a thing or two about making a living. “If you spent more of your time catching fish, soon you could buy a second boat. With the profits from that, you could buy more and more boats. Why, in 10 or 20 years I imagine you could sell that business to someone for quite a pretty penny!”

“What would I do then?” asked the fisherman.

“Well, in the morning you could go out and fish a little, if you would like, and then go home to spend time with your wife and your friends. Perhaps play a little guitar in the evenings”

If this wise fisherman can do it, why can’t I?

Obviously, living where I do, I can no more make my living fishing than I can go scuba diving. But say I were to do things that made money just enough so I could do the things I like?

But on the other hand, if the food I eat is locked up, am I really free of Taker culture?

I digress. On to the third tribal type: the living+working tribe. As a combination of the two mentioned before, in this type the same people you work with are the people in your community (meaning this in the communal sense of the word, of course). The most obvious example of this is the ethnic tribe. When puzzling over this type of tribe, I was reminded of the community in Starhawk’s Fifth Sacred Thing (another fantastic book). It has been a while since I read this, and I may not be getting the specifics right, but here are some general characteristics of this community:

They are responsible about their use and reuse of their resources. This includes trying to heal the damage already inflicted on the environment.

No one must work to survive. A bare sustenance is provided for everyone in the community.

The work that must be done (from childcare to medical care to music to…) is done by the people interested in doing it, and all contributions to the community are rewarded (though I hesitate to use that word). For example, a mother can stay at home to care for her children, but she is granted just as much credit as her partner who works outside the home.

There is no wealth hierarchy.

There is no ownership of the 4 sacred things (earth, air, fire, water).

There is coexistence of different lifestyles, races, cultures, religions, etc.

They employ hunting, foraging, and agriculture.

I realize that this community is not perfect, nor is it invulnerable. But I find it awfully attractive.

Saturday, January 13

Daniel Quinn

I have, in the past few weeks, read Daniel Quinn's Ishmael, The Story of B, and My Ishmael. Now, I know that there are many people who have read these, and many who have felt a fire kindle within them: a desire to save the world, if you will. And many have gone so far as to actually do something, however slight toward this goal that is not noble or morally right, just absolutely necessary for the continued survival of this species.

I'm not sure that the continued survival of this species is such a good idea. Quite frankly, I'm tempted to hope that we don't develop the capability of planetary colonization before our current path drives us to extinction.

The problem is, when I use these words, we, us, I'm just talking about the descendents of the Taker culture. There are still a few Leaver peoples left on this planet, and they don't deserve the destruction that will befall our planet.

That's another thing. Do you think it could be possible for our culture to die out, but the planet still to recover? Because I realized, as I typed the above paragraph, that the Leaver peoples will not necessarily die our as the rest of us do, unless we take the planet along with us, which is very possible.

But I hope, not inevitable.

But what do I do? Instinctually, my first thought is to grab a knife, a blanket, and a water bottle and head out. Fuck Taker Culture! But then there is of course the issue that I could never survive out there on my own for long. Okay, so I take some survival courses. I become the best damn survivalist ever. And I leave. And survive. And have a great life out in the middle of the Law of Life.

But what happens to everyone else? Do I have an obligation to save everyone else too? Because I could do it, man. I could leave and go and be Jane Goodall or whatever. But is that the point of Daniel Quinn's works?

I actually do think that it could be a point. He doesn't want us to give up technology, doesn't want us to 'go back' to anything. Part of what he wants is for us to go make lives for ourselves that are worth living.

I think I'll end it here for right now: You have to save yourself before you can save the world.

Strawson, Freedom, and Resentment

First and foremost, Peter Strawson wishes to point out that he does not know, and does not particularly care, exactly what the “thesis of determinism” is. He is only concerned with the fact that such a thesis does exist and that it involves actions being more or less determined in some sense or another. He also is not exceedingly concerned (for his own conclusion at any rate) about the truth or falsity of determinism. He then goes on to describe the viewpoints and disagreements of the “optimists and pessimists” of determinism, to which I will refer, more directly, as compatible determinists and incompatible libertarians. At the end of the article, Strawson concludes with a further distillation of the two viewpoints as they relate to his own personal thesis. I will present the two stances in due time, but will first go on to explain Strawson’s description of resentment, gratitude, indifference, offence, and other “reactive attitudes”.

There are many variations of ways to feel about another person, Strawson says. They are varied by our relationship to the person, the circumstances in which we interact, and not least by how and why they act toward us, or at least how and why we perceive they act toward us. Specifically, how we feel toward someone may vary quite a bit due directly to how we perceive their intentions.

If someone cuts you off on the interstate, how angry you feel about it will depend to some degree on what you know or think you know about the situation. Perhaps they have kids in the car and were distracted and didn’t see me, you might suppose, and then be persuaded to consider them in a somewhat kinder light. However, if you are quite sure that this wasn’t the case, you might think, some jerks have no regard for other people and think they can get away with anything. If this is how you perceive the situation, you might fume and flash gestures at them instead of just brushing it off.

Likewise, your feelings can be affected by how much choice you think the individual had in his actions. Being mentally unstable, under extreme duress or emotionally immature, as examples, may very well affect how you treat a person, perhaps differently than if someone else not under those condition(s) acted in the same way toward you.

So then, Strawson thinks that two of the greatest influences of variety in our treatment of people are their perceived intentions and their ability to choose their actions. But if determinism (whatever that means) is true, wouldn’t that limit our justification for varying our treatment of people? After all, when we think a person is limited in their choice of action in some way or another, we tend to give them a little leeway when meting out our resentment.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism, Strawson says, the average person would not change their feelings about moral responsibility. When using “just punishment” (implying moral responsibility) as a means for coercing people to behave in socially desirable ways, it would negate the usefulness of that particular method if moral responsibility were wholly abandoned. Also, when teaching children to behave in socially desirable ways, it would do no one any good in the long term to dismiss their disagreeable actions as results of determinism.

Going back to Strawson’s optimists and pessimists, his characterization of a compatible determinist’s (hereafter shortened to ‘determinist’) view is someone who feels that the facts – so far as we have them – do not show determinism to be false nor do they disprove the validity of moral responsibility and punishment. These things are effective in producing, as before stated, socially desirable actions and it is only because they are effective that we have punishments at all. Strawson’s incompatible libertarian (shortened to libertarian) is someone who thinks that if determinism is true, then moral responsibility and consequential punishment have no place in any society. A libertarian will retort immediately to a determinist that punishment implies guilt which implies moral responsibility which implies freedom which implies the falsity of determinism! The determinist counters that that chain of implication only holds for a sort of “negative freedom:” freedom from moral responsibility in cases of coercion, incapacity, insanity, or a sort duress causing the kind of action that could reasonably be expected from anyone. The libertarian will say that this sort of freedom exists, but that’s not the only sort about which she was talking.

Finally Strawson admits that he falls more into the compatible determinist camp, but only if the viewpoint, such as he has presented it, is “radically modified.” Mostly, this modification has to do with how he views the purpose of moral responsibility and subsequent punishment, that is to remember that they are functions of our morality and not the “calculated” causes of it.

David Wiggins disagrees that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant when discussing the “practices” of responsibility, resentment, punishment, etc. We need to determine the truth or falsity of the thesis of determinism before we move on to discussing the finer points of moral responsibility: Strawson’s resentment and other “reactive attitudes.” Refusing to make an assumption about the truth-value of determinism does not exempt one from the consequences of its truth-value. He also thinks that the conclusion drawn by Strawson from his explanation of compatible determinism and incompatible libertarianism is a fallacy. He feels the language and the usage of language doesn’t need to be explained in ways that differ at least a noticeable bit from the norm, as he thinks Strawson seems to think it does. He might even go so far as to say that the purpose of language is to use it properly and in the way one means, not to draw faulty conclusions from convoluted arguments.

Strawson might respond that, as Wiggins points out, the libertarian would agree with the better part of Strawson’s arguments, but not with the conclusion. Because it is mainly the conclusion that Wiggins protests, Strawson may say that’s only because Wiggins doesn’t agree with it. After all, Wiggins doesn’t offer much of an argument, he just writes off Strawson’s conclusion as unsound after saying that it does matter whether or not determinism is true. But if in fact this is not the case, and Wiggins is not being quite so petty as all that, perhaps the main thing Strawson would say is to reiterate that the truth-value of determinism is not a building block for the rest of one’s arguments about free will and moral responsibility.

A part of Strawson’s argument that is appealing to me is that whether or not the philosophers ever find determinism to be definitively true or false may not change how the average commoner views moral responsibility, guilt, punishment, and the like. Of course the average philosopher probably doesn’t spend most of her time wondering how the average commoner would feel about her viewpoint, so perhaps it is irrelevant that I like this particular point of Strawson’s.

But, like Wiggins, I do rather wonder about how Strawson arrived at his particular conclusion from his discussion of optimists and pessimists and attitudes. If what Wiggins says is true, that it is a non sequitur, and so it would seem, if Wiggins says he agrees with nearly everything in the argument but the conclusion. Of course, it is the ‘nearly’ part that might make a crucial difference for Strawson’s credibility here. It does seem a little distressing to me that the conclusion is a statement that moral responsibility comes from our morality, not that we use moral responsibility to further the livelihood of our morality.

Either way, I do agree that the attitudes of the ordinary commoner would remain fairly unaffected by the truth or falsity of determinism, but I don’t agree with Strawson’s way of going about ‘proving’ this. Actually, I don’t really think that sort of statement needs philosophical proof at all. It’s really more of a psychological question in my opinion.