Time lies, a dead mayfly on the windowsill

It should be very possible to get all philosophical about spring break, especially when one is at work and extremely bored. In essence, I'm getting paid to go off and write this philosophical treatise (Hey, it's St Patrick's Day, my illusions can party a little). Would that this made me a professional philosopher. And so I look around, searching for inspiration. Various parents with reluctant students in tow mill around aimlessly, except for the determined few that walk forcefully down the center aisle. At least somebody knows where they're going. Am I just jealous? Or am I simply angry that this is looking more like a journal entry than a blog post? Fresh start.

I feel as if I am in a state of constant self-betrayal. I loathe boredom, and yet I subject myself to it week after week for a few measly dollars. I soothe myself with promises that it isn't forever and I do need the money. The grey matter oozing out my ears pays no heed to the murmurings, though. What can I do, oh what can I do, oh what can I do, oh what can I do ... chantingchantingchanting, never stopping, never caring, slowly dying, without knowing. But I know everyone feels this, and for the uneducated young there are not many options more attractive than this. The pay is decent for what the work requires, and not stressful. Lovely. This has been an excellent fresh start. But who am I to question the leadings of the Muses?

The post runs short as the whine flows freely.

I will leave this as a testament to the petty trials of the not-yet-full-time philosopher.

Beyond Civilization

This book is more of a how-to than any of Quinn’s books I’ve read thus far, but even so, it’s more of a show-and-tell than a how-to. He builds on the foundation laid in the reader by the Ishmael trilogy (although the trilogy is certainly no necessary to understand this book) by pointing out extant tribal situation in the midst of Taker culture. Circuses, gypsies, etc. Giving an example from his own life, Quinn describes a newspaper in the production of which he was involved and which was tribal in organization.

I’m not sure if I am up to the task of defining a tribe without referring constantly to Quinn quotes. I’m going to describe what I have recognized as different sorts of tribal organizations. Without expending too much creativity, I’m going to call them working tribes, living tribes, and living+working tribes. One can imagine a Venn diagram of tribal organization.

Working tribes work together (predictably). The impetus for their initial organization can be a common interest, for instance information conveyance in Quinn’s newspaper. A possible problem that I could think of for this is the unfair division of proceeds in relation to input of effort.

Living tribes live together (whee). Their impetus is perhaps a desire to live in the same fashion, or familial relation. There is a sharing of resources (property, income, and the like) for overall livelihood of the group. Communal living (not, necessarily, an isolated ‘commune’) is one term for this. A problem I can see with a living tribe is unfair contribution leading either the hierarchy or unrest.

These two descriptions bring forth a question in my mind…can one be separate from Taker culture by being a member of only one of these two organizational types? I can imagine being in a working tribe and using that as your sole source of income…but here I am stuck. If you are getting all your sustenance from a tribe, are you outside Taker culture? And is it even possible?

I am reminded of a tale of a Mexican fisherman. This fisherman was just coming in from a morning in his boat when an American corporate businessman on vacation approached him.

“Sir,” he said, “I can see that your boat is not yet full. What are you going to do for the rest of the day?”

The fisherman looked up at him and grinned. “I will go home now, have lunch and siesta with my wife, and then later I will play with my children, and in the evening I will play my guitar and talk with my friends.”

“Well, that does sound nice, but why aren’t you going to go catch some more fish? At the rate you seem to be going, you could have a profitable business in no time.”

The fisherman stood and began to tie up his boat. “Why should I catch more fish, when I and my family can live on what I have just caught?”

The businessman smiled affectedly, relishing this chance to teach the fisherman a thing or two about making a living. “If you spent more of your time catching fish, soon you could buy a second boat. With the profits from that, you could buy more and more boats. Why, in 10 or 20 years I imagine you could sell that business to someone for quite a pretty penny!”

“What would I do then?” asked the fisherman.

“Well, in the morning you could go out and fish a little, if you would like, and then go home to spend time with your wife and your friends. Perhaps play a little guitar in the evenings”

If this wise fisherman can do it, why can’t I?

Obviously, living where I do, I can no more make my living fishing than I can go scuba diving. But say I were to do things that made money just enough so I could do the things I like?

But on the other hand, if the food I eat is locked up, am I really free of Taker culture?

I digress. On to the third tribal type: the living+working tribe. As a combination of the two mentioned before, in this type the same people you work with are the people in your community (meaning this in the communal sense of the word, of course). The most obvious example of this is the ethnic tribe. When puzzling over this type of tribe, I was reminded of the community in Starhawk’s Fifth Sacred Thing (another fantastic book). It has been a while since I read this, and I may not be getting the specifics right, but here are some general characteristics of this community:

They are responsible about their use and reuse of their resources. This includes trying to heal the damage already inflicted on the environment.

No one must work to survive. A bare sustenance is provided for everyone in the community.

The work that must be done (from childcare to medical care to music to…) is done by the people interested in doing it, and all contributions to the community are rewarded (though I hesitate to use that word). For example, a mother can stay at home to care for her children, but she is granted just as much credit as her partner who works outside the home.

There is no wealth hierarchy.

There is no ownership of the 4 sacred things (earth, air, fire, water).

There is coexistence of different lifestyles, races, cultures, religions, etc.

They employ hunting, foraging, and agriculture.

I realize that this community is not perfect, nor is it invulnerable. But I find it awfully attractive.

Daniel Quinn

I have, in the past few weeks, read Daniel Quinn's Ishmael, The Story of B, and My Ishmael. Now, I know that there are many people who have read these, and many who have felt a fire kindle within them: a desire to save the world, if you will. And many have gone so far as to actually do something, however slight toward this goal that is not noble or morally right, just absolutely necessary for the continued survival of this species.

I'm not sure that the continued survival of this species is such a good idea. Quite frankly, I'm tempted to hope that we don't develop the capability of planetary colonization before our current path drives us to extinction.

The problem is, when I use these words, we, us, I'm just talking about the descendents of the Taker culture. There are still a few Leaver peoples left on this planet, and they don't deserve the destruction that will befall our planet.

That's another thing. Do you think it could be possible for our culture to die out, but the planet still to recover? Because I realized, as I typed the above paragraph, that the Leaver peoples will not necessarily die our as the rest of us do, unless we take the planet along with us, which is very possible.

But I hope, not inevitable.

But what do I do? Instinctually, my first thought is to grab a knife, a blanket, and a water bottle and head out. Fuck Taker Culture! But then there is of course the issue that I could never survive out there on my own for long. Okay, so I take some survival courses. I become the best damn survivalist ever. And I leave. And survive. And have a great life out in the middle of the Law of Life.

But what happens to everyone else? Do I have an obligation to save everyone else too? Because I could do it, man. I could leave and go and be Jane Goodall or whatever. But is that the point of Daniel Quinn's works?

I actually do think that it could be a point. He doesn't want us to give up technology, doesn't want us to 'go back' to anything. Part of what he wants is for us to go make lives for ourselves that are worth living.

I think I'll end it here for right now: You have to save yourself before you can save the world.

Strawson, Freedom, and Resentment

First and foremost, Peter Strawson wishes to point out that he does not know, and does not particularly care, exactly what the “thesis of determinism” is. He is only concerned with the fact that such a thesis does exist and that it involves actions being more or less determined in some sense or another. He also is not exceedingly concerned (for his own conclusion at any rate) about the truth or falsity of determinism. He then goes on to describe the viewpoints and disagreements of the “optimists and pessimists” of determinism, to which I will refer, more directly, as compatible determinists and incompatible libertarians. At the end of the article, Strawson concludes with a further distillation of the two viewpoints as they relate to his own personal thesis. I will present the two stances in due time, but will first go on to explain Strawson’s description of resentment, gratitude, indifference, offence, and other “reactive attitudes”.

There are many variations of ways to feel about another person, Strawson says. They are varied by our relationship to the person, the circumstances in which we interact, and not least by how and why they act toward us, or at least how and why we perceive they act toward us. Specifically, how we feel toward someone may vary quite a bit due directly to how we perceive their intentions.

If someone cuts you off on the interstate, how angry you feel about it will depend to some degree on what you know or think you know about the situation. Perhaps they have kids in the car and were distracted and didn’t see me, you might suppose, and then be persuaded to consider them in a somewhat kinder light. However, if you are quite sure that this wasn’t the case, you might think, some jerks have no regard for other people and think they can get away with anything. If this is how you perceive the situation, you might fume and flash gestures at them instead of just brushing it off.

Likewise, your feelings can be affected by how much choice you think the individual had in his actions. Being mentally unstable, under extreme duress or emotionally immature, as examples, may very well affect how you treat a person, perhaps differently than if someone else not under those condition(s) acted in the same way toward you.

So then, Strawson thinks that two of the greatest influences of variety in our treatment of people are their perceived intentions and their ability to choose their actions. But if determinism (whatever that means) is true, wouldn’t that limit our justification for varying our treatment of people? After all, when we think a person is limited in their choice of action in some way or another, we tend to give them a little leeway when meting out our resentment.

Regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism, Strawson says, the average person would not change their feelings about moral responsibility. When using “just punishment” (implying moral responsibility) as a means for coercing people to behave in socially desirable ways, it would negate the usefulness of that particular method if moral responsibility were wholly abandoned. Also, when teaching children to behave in socially desirable ways, it would do no one any good in the long term to dismiss their disagreeable actions as results of determinism.

Going back to Strawson’s optimists and pessimists, his characterization of a compatible determinist’s (hereafter shortened to ‘determinist’) view is someone who feels that the facts – so far as we have them – do not show determinism to be false nor do they disprove the validity of moral responsibility and punishment. These things are effective in producing, as before stated, socially desirable actions and it is only because they are effective that we have punishments at all. Strawson’s incompatible libertarian (shortened to libertarian) is someone who thinks that if determinism is true, then moral responsibility and consequential punishment have no place in any society. A libertarian will retort immediately to a determinist that punishment implies guilt which implies moral responsibility which implies freedom which implies the falsity of determinism! The determinist counters that that chain of implication only holds for a sort of “negative freedom:” freedom from moral responsibility in cases of coercion, incapacity, insanity, or a sort duress causing the kind of action that could reasonably be expected from anyone. The libertarian will say that this sort of freedom exists, but that’s not the only sort about which she was talking.

Finally Strawson admits that he falls more into the compatible determinist camp, but only if the viewpoint, such as he has presented it, is “radically modified.” Mostly, this modification has to do with how he views the purpose of moral responsibility and subsequent punishment, that is to remember that they are functions of our morality and not the “calculated” causes of it.

David Wiggins disagrees that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant when discussing the “practices” of responsibility, resentment, punishment, etc. We need to determine the truth or falsity of the thesis of determinism before we move on to discussing the finer points of moral responsibility: Strawson’s resentment and other “reactive attitudes.” Refusing to make an assumption about the truth-value of determinism does not exempt one from the consequences of its truth-value. He also thinks that the conclusion drawn by Strawson from his explanation of compatible determinism and incompatible libertarianism is a fallacy. He feels the language and the usage of language doesn’t need to be explained in ways that differ at least a noticeable bit from the norm, as he thinks Strawson seems to think it does. He might even go so far as to say that the purpose of language is to use it properly and in the way one means, not to draw faulty conclusions from convoluted arguments.

Strawson might respond that, as Wiggins points out, the libertarian would agree with the better part of Strawson’s arguments, but not with the conclusion. Because it is mainly the conclusion that Wiggins protests, Strawson may say that’s only because Wiggins doesn’t agree with it. After all, Wiggins doesn’t offer much of an argument, he just writes off Strawson’s conclusion as unsound after saying that it does matter whether or not determinism is true. But if in fact this is not the case, and Wiggins is not being quite so petty as all that, perhaps the main thing Strawson would say is to reiterate that the truth-value of determinism is not a building block for the rest of one’s arguments about free will and moral responsibility.

A part of Strawson’s argument that is appealing to me is that whether or not the philosophers ever find determinism to be definitively true or false may not change how the average commoner views moral responsibility, guilt, punishment, and the like. Of course the average philosopher probably doesn’t spend most of her time wondering how the average commoner would feel about her viewpoint, so perhaps it is irrelevant that I like this particular point of Strawson’s.

But, like Wiggins, I do rather wonder about how Strawson arrived at his particular conclusion from his discussion of optimists and pessimists and attitudes. If what Wiggins says is true, that it is a non sequitur, and so it would seem, if Wiggins says he agrees with nearly everything in the argument but the conclusion. Of course, it is the ‘nearly’ part that might make a crucial difference for Strawson’s credibility here. It does seem a little distressing to me that the conclusion is a statement that moral responsibility comes from our morality, not that we use moral responsibility to further the livelihood of our morality.

Either way, I do agree that the attitudes of the ordinary commoner would remain fairly unaffected by the truth or falsity of determinism, but I don’t agree with Strawson’s way of going about ‘proving’ this. Actually, I don’t really think that sort of statement needs philosophical proof at all. It’s really more of a psychological question in my opinion.

Jim1 and Jim2

An unfortunate human named Jim was the victim of an amazing mechanically complex farm equipment accident in July, which severed his body so that each half of his body was left with exactly half of all organs. Each half was thrown clear of the machine and so far apart that the different rescue parties did not realize that the other half existed and so, each half was fitted with state-of-the-art prostheses in such a way that two functional bodies lived. Each survivor professes to be Jim and has the same memories, strengths, goals, and convictions.

Derek Parfit is called in to evaluate the situation. Parfit in general does not believe in the all-or-nothing mentality when referring to personal identity, so he is not concerned with saying whether or not these two beings are each the same person as Jim. He chooses to employ two descriptive terms – psychological continuity and psychological connectedness – when discussing the status of the beings.

Psychological connectedness means there is some inheritance of memories or attitudes or personality from the former being to the later one. Psychological continuity has a weaker implication than psychological connectedness and simply entails an overlapping chain of instances of psychological connectedness. For instance – if one was using only memory as a criterion, which is not the case for Parfit but will be used here for the sake of example - if a little girl gets her doll eaten by a dog and remembers the incident years later on her 25th birthday and then when she is 75 remembers her 25th birthday but not the dog incident, it could be said that the crone is connected to the young woman but only continuous with the girl.

In the case of Jim, Parfit would say that Jim is psychologically connected to both beings, that Jim has survived in both beings, but not that the beings are the same people as Jim. Each of the survivors is a ‘later self’ of Jim. Therefore, they could each refer to Jim as an ‘earlier self’ while not needing to regard themselves as the same person, or they could even say that they are ‘more or less’ the same person as Jim without needing to be ‘more or less’ the same as each other.


However, ‘Jim1 and Jim2’ are not completely assuaged by this evaluation so they ask for another perspective. A Lockian analyst is brought in to help. She explains Locke’s perspective on personal identity. Locke draws a semantic difference between the words ‘man’ and ‘person’ that is roughly equal to the difference between the concepts ‘ physical body’ and ‘mental consciousness.’ Furthermore, with regard to personal identity what matters for Locke is simply continuity of consciousness, which can be defined as continuity of memories, personality, beliefs, and (/or) goals. Because both of the survivors are consciously continuous with Jim, the analyst concludes that they are both the same person as Jim, but not the same man as Jim. (One thing that might make Locke’s assessment easier to make is if some testimony by the former Jim’s acquaintances was given, saying that when interacting separately with the two survivors, they are both extremely convincing Jims. This sort of independent verification seems important to Locke.)

This author finds Parfit’s arguments more compelling in this situation. Perhaps this is because it seems to make more sense intuitively to say that each survivor is very definitely related strongly to Jim but not feel compelled to have to identify the survivors as either ‘the same person’ as Jim or not, since it would be illogical to say that one was the same person as Jim and the other not since they are, for all intents and purposes, related to Jim in exactly the same way; nor is it intuitively comfortable to refer to them both as the same person as Jim, since they are not the same person as each other.

Although one weakness of Parfit’s evaluation could be that one doesn’t have an answer for the question ‘Is this man/person/survivor Jim?’ this author finds it a strength for the same reason she rejects the binary zero-sum attitude of Locke, namely because the idea is overwhelmingly appealing to her intuition. Parfit himself thinks this completely unnecessary, but other people might want a definitive answer. Also, if one thinks numerical identity is intrinsically locked up in the question of personal identity, Parfit is not going to satisfy.

Later that year, in September, Jim1 and Jim2 are working on another farm and are both involved in an accident in which all the prosthetics are severed from their bodies and thrown clear. The two halves are then fused together to result in one surviving body, which claims to be Jim and has the same memories, strengths, goals, and convictions.

Again Parfit says that this being is a ‘later self’ of Jim. But while this survivor is psychologically connected to Jim1 and Jim2, he is merely psychologically continuous with Jim.

The Lockian analyst is a bit perplexed by the situation, because in July she said there were two persons who were both the same person as Jim; the survivors have since been having different experiences and are no longer consciously continuous with each other, therefore the latest survivor cannot still be Jim, because the line of continuity has been broken or at least re-fused at the end with a split in the middle.

This author cannot see a way in which the Lockian analyst could reply in this situation that the final survivor is still Jim. But then who is he? And what happened to the two survivors that were Jim? When presented with the two situations together as a whole there might be a way for the analyst to explain it in a way that fits with Locke, but when confronted with the situations separately there seems to be a major problem or at least an incongruity.

Again, Parfit seems better able to handle this situation in a consistent way. However, perhaps this is because his is a weak, rather wishy-washy view. Instead of picking one or the other, he picks neither. Is this getting around the issue, or just being smart enough to rise above the points that don’t matter?

This author thinks that Parfit is accurate in both of his assessments and that by choosing to regard two points of contention – one, that someone either must be the same person as they were before or they must not and two, that regardless of the fact of the matter where one is concerned, we have to decide on one before we can make any statements about personal identity – as irrelevant, he makes this situation more easy and more consistent to evaluate than one is able to do under the tenets held by Locke.